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SMITH, CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY, AND SPEECH-
BASED CLAIMS FOR RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS 




Does proscribing discrimination on the basis of religion itself 
discriminate against religion?  In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,1 
the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, recently dodged this question, 
holding instead that Hastings College of the Law’s anti-discrimination 
policy, which apparently required student organizations to admit or 
allow any student to participate in its activities (an “all-comers policy”), 
did not violate the First Amendment rights of a student organization that 
sought to exclude students on the basis of religion and sexual 
orientation.2
But, because there was some dispute as to whether the law school 
actually had an all-comers policy or whether its anti-discrimination 
requirements were limited to prohibiting discrimination “on the basis of 
race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or 
sexual orientation,” as set forth in the school’s written policy 
(“nondiscrimination policy”),3 the question of whether this latter type of 
anti-discrimination measure would survive constitutional scrutiny was 
very much on the minds of the Justices.4  Justice Alito, writing for the 
four dissenting Justices, in fact concluded that the law school’s 
nondiscrimination policy violated the First Amendment on grounds that 
it discriminated against religious expression by allowing ideological 
∗  Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.  I am deeply indebted to Gregory 
Goldman for his research assistance.  I would also like to extend special thanks to Ira Lupu and 
Fred Gedicks for their helpful ideas and comments. 
1 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
2 Id. at 2978. 
3 See id. at 2979, 2982-84 & nn.6-10. 
4 This question was specifically addressed in the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens, see 
id. at 2995-98 (Stevens, J., concurring), and the dissenting opinion of Justice Alito, see id. at 
3000-13 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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organizations to discriminate against those who did not share their 
views, but prohibiting religious organizations from doing the same.5
At one level, of course, Justice Alito’s observation is accurate. 
The nondiscrimination policy ostensibly allows secular groups to 
discriminate in favor of students who share their beliefs while it 
presumably prohibits religious organizations from doing the same.  But 
whether this result stems from the fact that anti-religious discrimination 
laws discriminate against religion or simply reflects the impact of an 
otherwise neutral law, as Justice Stevens argued in his concurrence,6 is 
a matter of some debate. 
Further, Justice Alito’s solution, exempting religious organizations 
from nondiscrimination policy requirements,7 creates inequalities as 
well.  After all, the nondiscrimination policy also prevents secular 
groups from discriminating on the basis of religion.  A pro-choice 
group, for example, could not deny membership to a person who held 
religious objections to abortion.  Why should religious-group 
discrimination be allowed but secular-group discrimination prohibited?8  
Seen in this light, Justice Alito’s argument is one for a special 
exemption for religion and not one for equal treatment.  As such, his 
opinion raises the question of whether an exemption for a religious 
organization from a neutral law of general applicability can be required 
under the Speech Clause, even as similar claims for an exemption are no 
longer cognizable after Employment Division v. Smith9 under the Free 
Exercise Clause. 
This Article attempts to unpack the claim for a special exemption 
for religious organizations advanced in Justice Alito’s Christian Legal 
Society opinion.  Part I introduces the issue by identifying two facets of 
religion that are implicated by religious discrimination issues—the 
notion of religion as a set of ideas and the notion of religion as a 
fundamental aspect of self-identity.  As will be shown, distinguishing 
between these two aspects of religion can assist in navigating the 
inordinately complex issues raised by the application of anti-religious 
discrimination law to religious organizations.  Part II then addresses and 
ultimately rejects Justice Alito’s claim that Hastings’ nondiscrimination 
policy constitutes viewpoint-based discrimination.  Rather, it concludes 
that the policy is a content-neutral measure that prohibits religious and 
secular anti-religious discrimination equally; and, therefore, the 
5 See id. at 3003-04, 3010-11 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
6 See id. at 2996 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
7 See id. at 3012, 3014 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
8 Similarly, the nondiscrimination policy prevents a race-based organization from excluding 
a person of a different race just as much as it bars a religious organization from discriminating on 
the basis of religion.  Again, under Justice Alito's formulation, why should only religious 
discrimination be allowed? 
9 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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Christian Legal Society’s (CLS) First Amendment claim must be 
understood as a claim for a free speech exemption from a neutral law. 
Proceeding from this conclusion, Part III identifies and engages the 
arguments that support claims for a free speech exemption for religious 
organizations from neutral laws.  Part IV then examines the broader 
concerns that surround the issue of whether religious speech should be 
entitled to special exemptions from neutral laws and, following from 
this analysis, contends that the claim for a religious speech exemption 
should be rejected as not only inconsistent with Smith and free exercise 
law, but also with fundamental principles of free speech jurisprudence. 
One caveat: This Article does not analyze the issue actually 
resolved in Christian Legal Society, i.e., whether Hastings’ purported 
all-comers policy violates the First Amendment.  Rather, it focuses 
entirely on the type of specific anti-religious discrimination provision 
that is in Hastings’ written non-discrimination policy and that is far 
more commonly found in civil rights statutes in general. 
I. CONCEPTUALIZING RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
In a previous writing, I suggested that it might be helpful in 
understanding Religion Clause issues to examine what it is about 
religion that merits constitutional concern.10  As discussed in that 
article, the constitutional significance of religion can be characterized in 
two ways.11  The first is that we are concerned with religion because of 
the ideas that it presents and the answers that it provides.  That is, the 
constitutional import of religion is that, like philosophy or politics, 
religion is valuable as a set of ideas (“religion as ideas”).12  The second 
is that religion plays a particularly important role in an individual’s 
sense of self.13  That is, religion, like race or gender, has constitutional 
import because of the role it plays in self-identity (“religion as 
identity”).  To be sure, religion includes both elements of identity and 
ideas.  When a hypothetical believer, for example, asserts, “I am a 
Christian,” he is likely saying something about the ideas he holds as 
well as something about his sense of who he is.14  Nevertheless, 
 10 William P. Marshall, Religion as Ideas: Religion as Identity, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
385 (1996). 
11 Id. at 391-92. 
 12 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 & n.4 (2001); see also 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995). 
13 See Daniel O. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of The Establishment Clause, 82 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1113, 1164-65 (1988); Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and
Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 307-08 (1986); Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of
Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 202 (1991).
14 See Marshall, supra note 10, at 391. 
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viewing religion through an ideas or identity lens might help us develop 
a framework from which to approach difficult Religion Clause issues. 
This dichotomy between religion as ideas and religion as identity is 
a good starting point for working through the difficult issues presented 
by religious discrimination,15 as the ideas/identity dichotomy comes 
into play with respect to two central issues in the religious 
discrimination controversy: Why do religious organizations 
discriminate along religious lines, and why do anti-discrimination 
provisions such as Hastings’ written policy or laws like Title VII16 
typically protect religious adherents, but not secular ideological 
adherents, from discrimination against them?17
The answer to why governments tend to protect religion, and not 
secular ideologies, from discrimination is the more straightforward of 
the two questions.  Using the ideas/identity dichotomy, the purpose of 
such laws is, virtually by definition, to curb identity-based 
discrimination.18  Anti-discrimination laws have traditionally been 
intended to prohibit discrimination against people who suffered from 
prejudice based upon such intractable characteristics of self as race, 
gender, or nationality.  Although not immutable,19 religion has 
traditionally been included in this category.  History is unfortunately 
replete with instances of discrimination against particular religions, and 
American history, specifically, has witnessed periodic outbreaks of 
serious anti-Semitism,20 anti-Catholicism,21 and anti-Mormonism,22 to 
name but a few examples.  Accordingly, because unpopular and 
 15 Indeed, in this regard, it is notable that that some of the Justices in Christian Legal Society 
appeared to engage in a parallel analysis in attempting to distinguish between discrimination on 
the basis of status and discrimination on the basis of belief.  See Christian Legal Soc’y v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010); id. at 2996 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 3011 n.5 
(Alito, J., dissenting). 
16 Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006). 
 17 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 1919, 1931-33 (2006) (noting that most anti-discrimination laws protect against 
discrimination that targets religion but not discrimination that targets other ideologies). 
18 Anti-discrimination laws typically do not prevent discrimination on the basis of ideas or 
ideology, although, as Noah Feldman points out, there have been some ideologies, such as 
Communism, whose adherents have suffered from substantial discrimination.  Noah Feldman, 
From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 
673, 714-15 (2002). 
 19 Several scholars, however, have regarded religion as an immutable characteristic as much 
as is race.  That is to say that religion is not a choice, but something that people are born with or 
are compelled by a higher being to adhere to.  See, e.g., Timothy L. Hall, Religion, Equality, and 
Difference, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 62 (1992). 
 20 See generally ANTI-SEMITISM IN AMERICA (Jeffrey S. Gurock ed., 1998) (noting the 
various periods of anti-Semitism in American history). 
 21 See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002) (tracing how 
the metaphor of the separation between church and state gained traction in American legal 
thought in the nineteenth century because of a wave of anti-Catholicism). 
 22 See generally TERRYL L. GIVENS, THE LATTER-DAY SAINT EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA 59-
89 (2004) (recounting anti-Mormonism in American history). 
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minority religions have historically suffered the same types of invidious 
discrimination that have plagued racial and ethnic minorities, they have 
been included in the civil rights laws’ protected classes.23
Why religious organizations choose to discriminate along religious 
lines is more variable.  Some religious organizations may choose to 
discriminate because of ideas.  A religious organization may choose to 
exclude those who do not share its tenets because it believes the 
inclusion of nonbelievers will weaken or dilute its message.  When this 
is the case, the organization’s actions are similar to those of an 
environmental organization choosing to exclude members who do not 
believe in protecting the environment. 
But religious discrimination can also be based on the classic form 
of anti-identity animus that anti-discrimination provisions are designed 
to redress.  Religion, as noted earlier, plays a fundamental role in 
framing an individual’s identity.24  Identity, however, as numerous 
writers have noted, is a two-edged sword, and its downside is that it 
often includes a strong dis-identity from opposite groups.25  This dis-
identity has often led to discrimination or worse against those groups 
perceived as the “other.”26
One further point: Conceptualizing religious discrimination as 
based on anti-religious animus does not mean that it necessarily falls 
outside the scope of protected expression.  As long as the organization’s 
anti-religion animus is perceived as part of the message of the 
organization, cases like Roberts v. United States Jaycees27 and Boy 
Scouts of America v. Dale28 hold that membership exclusions do 
implicate First Amendment concerns.29  Seeing religious discrimination 
as based on animus towards religion or religions, however, does 
demonstrate why Justice Alito’s initial comparison of religious 
organizations that want to discriminate along religious lines with secular 
 23 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006); see also Jesse H. Choper, Religion and Race Under 
the Constitution: Similarities and Differences, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 491, 492 (1994) (explaining 
that conduct associated with religious discrimination, such as “public (and private) stereotyping, 
stigma, subordination and persecution,” is sufficiently similar to discriminatory conduct based on 
race as to draw a rational parallel for treatment under the Constitution). 
24 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
 25 See ERIK H. ERIKSON, LIFE HISTORY AND THE HISTORICAL MOMENT 176-77 (1975); 
Daniel Bell, Ethnicity and Social Change, in ETHNICITY: THEORY AND EXPERIENCE 141 (Nathan 
Glazer & Daniel P. Moynihan eds., 1975); Karst, supra note 13, at 370; see also Frederick Mark 
Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the Liberal State, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 47 
(discussing the negative aspect of group fostering of an individual’s self-identity). 
26 See Charles Simic, The Spider’s Web, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 25, 1993, at 18, 18-19 
(“Sooner or later our tribe always comes to ask us to agree to murder.”). 
27 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
28 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 29 Conduct alone, however, may not trigger First Amendment protection, even if based on 
anti-religious animus.  See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 479 (1993) (holding that penalty 
enhancements for hate crimes do not violate the First Amendment). 
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groups that want to discriminate along secular lines is a misguided 
equation.  Because the focus of Hastings’ nondiscrimination policy is to 
combat anti-religious animus, the comparable secular group to the 
religious group that wants to discriminate on the basis of religion is not 
the group that does not want its own message diluted by the inclusion of 
non-adherents, e.g., the environmental group that wants to exclude those 
who do not want to protect the environment.  Rather, the religious 
group’s secular counterpart is the one that seeks to exclude members of 
a particular religion or set of religions, e.g., the environmental group 
that does not want to admit Jews or Christians. 
II. ARE ANTI-RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS
VIEWPOINT-BASED? 
Hastings’ nondiscrimination policy provides that the school “shall 
not discriminate unlawfully on the basis of race, color, religion, national 
origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or sexual orientation.”30  The 
provision is fairly typical of most anti-discrimination measures in that it 
focuses on protecting what are perceived to be vulnerable classes from 
adverse treatment.  Like most anti-discrimination statutes, the policy 
does not prevent organizations from discriminating on the basis of 
ideology.31  The question is whether, as Justice Alito argues, the policy 
should therefore be considered viewpoint-based. 
To Justice Alito, the discrimination exercised by a religious 
organization seeking to exclude non-adherents is religion as ideas.32  As 
he sees it, when a religious group seeks to exclude non-members, they 
are simply trying to protect their ideas from dilution or abridgement. 
Conceptualizing religious discrimination in this manner leads Justice 
Alito to conclude that, because the nondiscrimination policy allows a 
secular organization to discriminate on the basis of ideology but 
prevents religious organizations from doing the same, the law school 
has engaged in impermissible, content-based regulation against 
religious groups.33  As he explains: 
 30 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2979 (2010) (quoting 2 Joint Appendix 
at 230, Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371)). 
31 See Volokh, supra note 17, at 1930-31. 
 32 See Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 3009 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“In an unbroken line 
of decisions analyzing private religious speech in limited public forums, we have made it 
perfectly clear that ‘[r]eligion is [a] viewpoint from which ideas are conveyed.’” (alterations in 
original) (citing Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 & n.4 (2001); 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel 
v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-94 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 277 (1981))).
33 See id. at 3010. 
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[T]he policy singled out one category of expressive associations for
disfavored treatment: groups formed to express a religious message.
Only religious groups were required to admit students who did not
share their views.  An environmentalist group was not required to
admit students who rejected global warming.  An animal rights group
was not obligated to accept students who supported the use of
animals to test cosmetics.  But CLS was required to admit avowed
atheists.  This was patent viewpoint discrimination.34
The first problem, of course, is whether, as a factual matter, 
religious discrimination by religious organizations can be so readily 
classified as based upon ideas.  As noted earlier, religious 
discrimination may often be the result of anti-religious animus based on 
the identity of the target of the discrimination, and not an expression of 
theological principle.35  And, interestingly enough, Justice Alito appears 
to characterize religious discrimination by secular organizations exactly 
in that light—anti-religious animus.36  Justice Alito’s approach then is 
apparently to assume, without explanation, that religious discrimination 
by religious groups is based on ideology, and therefore constitutionally 
protected,37 but that religious discrimination by secular groups is based 
on anti-religious animus, and so is not.38
But aside from unexplained assumptions, there are serious 
doctrinal implications in equating prohibitions on religious 
discrimination by religious organizations with viewpoint discrimination. 
As Professors Brownstein and Amar point out, characterizing anti-
religious discrimination provisions in this way suggests that many civil 
rights statutes, such as Title VII,39 constitute viewpoint discrimination 
because they disallow discrimination against religious adherents but not 
34 Id. 
 35 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.  Justice Alito seemed to acknowledge this in 
a footnote.  See Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 3011 n.5 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
36 To Justice Alito,  
groups that are dedicated to expressing a viewpoint on a secular topic (for example, a 
political or ideological viewpoint) would have no basis for limiting membership based 
on religion because the presence of members with diverse religious beliefs would have 
no effect on the group’s ability to express its views. 
Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 3012 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 37 To be sure, Justice Alito does indicate that if a religious group were to discriminate on 
religious grounds based solely on the identity of the target group, such discrimination would not 
raise constitutional concern.  Id. at 3011 & n.5. 
 38 Actually, Justice Alito may be too quick in asserting that a secular group “would have no 
basis for limiting membership based on religion because the presence of members with diverse 
religious beliefs would have no effect on the group’s ability to express its views.”  See id. at 
3012.  Whether the secular group’s message would be infringed by having to admit persons of 
particular religions depends entirely on whether the group’s discriminatory behavior is somehow 
tied to its message.  See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. 
39 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006). 
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against adherents to non-religious ideologies.40  Under Title VII, an 
employer, if it chooses, can discriminate against environmentalists or 
Republicans, but it cannot discriminate against Baptists.  As such, to 
follow Justice Alito’s logic, Title VII is unconstitutional. 
There is, of course, an easy response to which I have already 
alluded.  Title VII and similar measures, such as Hastings’ 
nondiscrimination provision, were not designed to prohibit 
discrimination against ideas.  The purpose of these measures was to 
guard against those who would discriminate against individuals on the 
basis of the latter’s identities.41  Thus an employer who discriminates 
against Baptists is prohibited from doing so because he has an invidious 
bias against Baptists and not because he disagrees with Baptist 
theology.  Laws that prevent discrimination against religion but not 
secular ideologies thus escape content-based scrutiny because they are 
not treating two viewpoints differently—forbidding discrimination 
against religious belief while allowing discrimination against secular 
belief.  Rather, such laws do not address viewpoint discrimination at all. 
But while seeing anti-religious discrimination provisions as content 
neutral may be helpful in upholding Title VII, it is not helpful in 
supporting the case that religious organizations such as CLS should be 
excused from anti-religious discrimination requirements.42  If a law that 
 40 See Alan Brownstein & Vikram Amar, Reviewing Associational Freedom Claims in a 
Limited Public Forum: An Extension of the Distinction Between Debate-Dampening and Debate-
Distorting State Action, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 505, 530-31, 537-38 (2011); see also Volokh, 
supra note 17, at 1933 (“[A]ntidiscrimination law . . . bans discrimination based on targets’ 
religion and not discrimination based on targets’ other ideologies . . . .”). 
 41 The United States Commission on Civil Rights’ 1979 consultation entitled “Religious 
Discrimination: A Neglected Issue” provides a helpful distinction between religion as ideas and 
religion as identity.  The Commission, which is, among other things, charged with reviewing the 
efficacy of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including Title VII, see generally Mission, U.S. 
COMMISSION ON CIV. RTS., http://www.usccr.gov (follow “Mission” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 
27, 2011), noted in its consultation that it was concerned with 
[r]eligious civil rights . . . [which] cluster around the equal protection and due process
clauses of the 14th amendment, which prohibit discrimination against individuals
which denies them equal protection of the laws, equality of status under the law, equal
treatment in the administration of justice, and equality of opportunity and access to
employment, education, housing, public services and facilities, and public
accommodations because of their exercise of their right to religious freedom.
U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, Preface to RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION: A NEGLECTED ISSUE 
(1980).  According to the Commission, the issues of religious civil rights are distinct from, 
“[r]eligious civil liberties issues[, which] cluster around the first amendment right to individual 
freedom of religion, including such issues as the right to hold or not to hold a religious faith, and 
the prohibition against the establishment of a religion by government.”  Id.  Thus, religious civil 
rights concern religion as identity while religious civil liberties concern religion as ideas. 
 42 Alternatively, it could be maintained that laws that prevent discrimination against religion 
but not against secular ideologies are content-based but nevertheless survive constitutional 
scrutiny because they are supported by a compelling state interest.  Discrimination against 
religion, it might be argued, has historically been a particularly vile form of bias, and the state has 
a compelling interest in singling out this form of prejudice for redress, which does not apply to 
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prohibits discrimination against religion but not secular ideologies is 
content neutral, it cannot at the same time be content-based, even if it 
has the effect of preventing religious organizations from discriminating 
on the basis of shared beliefs while not preventing secular organizations 
from doing the same. 
Professors Brownstein and Amar make this point remarkably 
effectively: 
CLS argued that it is viewpoint discrimination to prohibit religious 
organizations from discriminating on the basis of religious belief 
while permitting secular political organizations to discriminate on the 
basis of nonreligious belief.  But it is not viewpoint discrimination to 
prohibit secular political organizations from discriminating on the 
basis of religious belief while permitting religious organizations to 
discriminate on the basis of secular beliefs.  Religious student 
organizations receive more associational autonomy than their secular 
counterparts and religious students receive more protection for their 
beliefs than students who hold secular beliefs.  Unfortunately for 
CLS, that is not the way free speech doctrine works.  The prohibition 
against viewpoint discrimination is, and has to be, fiercely even-
handed.  If religion is going to be construed as a viewpoint of speech 
in freedom of association cases, it is difficult to see how anti-
discrimination policies can treat religion differently than secular 
belief systems or religious groups differently than those that adhere 
to secular beliefs.  To conform to viewpoint neutrality, government 
would have to prohibit discrimination based on both religious and 
secular beliefs or decline to prohibit discrimination based on either 
belief system.43
CLS, in short, cannot claim that a law is content neutral when it protects 
religion but not secular ideology from adverse discrimination, but that 
the same law is content-based when it prevents religious organizations 
from discriminating on religious grounds while allowing secular 
ideological organizations to discriminate on secular ideological 
grounds.  A law is either content neutral or it is not.  And because 
Hastings’ nondiscrimination policy prohibits all speakers (and non-
speakers) from anti-religious discrimination, it is content neutral. 
This is not to deny that the effects of an anti-religious 
discrimination provision may be harsher on a religious organization 
bias against secular ideologies.  But see Feldman, supra note 18, at 718 (noting that secular 
ideologies have also been subject to serious bias). 
 Although describing the state’s interest in combating religious discrimination as 
compelling may again be helpful in insulating anti-discrimination laws such as Title VII from 
constitutional attack, it is not helpful to religious groups seeking exemption from anti-religious 
discrimination law.  If the state has a compelling interest in proscribing religious discrimination, 
that interest should apply as much to preventing religious discrimination by religious groups as it 
does to preventing religious discrimination by secular organizations. 
43 Brownstein & Amar, supra note 40, at 533. 
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than on a secular one (if we assume religious organizations are more 
likely to want to choose to discriminate along religious lines).  Nor does 
it refute that the end result of having anti-religious discrimination 
requirements, as Justice Alito suggests, is that unlike secular ideological 
organizations, religious organizations cannot limit their membership to 
only those who share their beliefs.  But these consequences only signify 
that a content neutral law can have disparate effects on different 
speakers.44  And, as Justice Stevens noted in his Christian Legal Society 
concurrence, the First Amendment does not protect against disparate 
impacts.45
III. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF A SPEECH CLAUSE-BASED
EXEMPTION FOR RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION 
Concluding that anti-religious discrimination laws are content 
neutral does not end the inquiry.  Content neutrality is not absolute and 
there are arguments that religious discrimination by religious 
organizations is sufficiently distinct from religious discrimination by 
secular organizations to merit different constitutional consideration, and 
therefore possible exemption from anti-religious discrimination 
requirements.  This Part will review these arguments. 
A. Anti-Religious Discrimination Laws Have a More Severe
Effect on the “Messages” of Religious Groups than Those
of Secular Organizations 
A first possible line of attack is to suggest that religious 
discrimination by religious groups merits greater constitutional 
protection than religious discrimination by secular organizations 
because the constitutional rights of religious organizations are more 
severely affected by anti-religious discrimination laws than are the 
rights of secular organizations.  Justice Alito, in fact, appears to offer 
this argument in his Christian Legal Society dissent when he states:  
[G]roups that are dedicated to expressing a viewpoint on a secular
topic (for example, a political or ideological viewpoint) would have
no basis for limiting membership based on religion because the
presence of members with diverse religious beliefs would have no
44 See Volokh, supra note 17, at 1931-32. 
 45 See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2996 & n.2 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (citing Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763 (1994); R.A.V. v. St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 
537, 549 (1987); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623, 628 (1984)). 
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effect on the group’s ability to express its views.  But for religious 
groups, the situation is very different.46
This proposition, however, is debatable.  The message of a 
religious organization is not automatically diluted by the presence of 
non-co-religionists.  It may be true that having Baptists in a Catholic 
organization, for example, dilutes the latter’s message, but that is not 
necessarily so.47  It depends upon what the Catholic group’s underlying 
message is. 
Conversely, a secular group that wants to discriminate on the basis 
of religion may have its message diluted by the compelled admission of 
religious members.  This would most obviously be true with respect to a 
“We Hate Religious People Society,” but it also might be the case with 
respect to groups in which anti-religion bias is not the prime focus. 
Consider a pro-choice group that refuses admission to Catholics because 
of the latter’s opposition to abortion, or a gay rights group that denies 
membership to Mormons because of the latter’s opposition to same-sex 
marriage.  In both cases, the discriminating organization may believe 
that its message would be diluted if it were required to accept those with 
religious objections to its message.  The question of message dilution, in 
short, depends completely on the basis of the group’s exclusionary 
policies and not categorically, as Judge Alito would have it, on whether 
the organization is religious or secular. 
This point, moreover, should not have been a revelation.  The 
proposition that it is the nature of the message that determines whether 
an organization’s discriminatory policies implicate the right of 
expressive association had already been recognized by the Court prior 
to Christian Legal Society.  In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,48 the 
Court held that the determination of whether an anti-discrimination 
provision diluted an organization’s message depended upon the group’s 
self-characterization of the meaning of its discriminatory policies.49
B. The State’s Interest in Combating Religious Discrimination by
Religious Organizations Is Less Compelling than Its Interest in
Combating Religious Discrimination by Secular Groups 
A second argument distinguishing between anti-religious 
discrimination by religious and secular groups is that applying anti-
46 See id. at 3012 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 47 Indeed, a religious group might welcome non-adherents so that it can disseminate its 
message to those outside its membership. 
48 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
49 See id. at 653 (“As we give deference to an association’s assertions regarding the nature of 
its expression, we must also give deference to an association’s view of what would impair its 
expression.”). 
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religious discrimination laws to religious groups is less compelling than 
applying those laws to secular organizations.  Justice Alito seems to 
advance this position as well when, quoting the brief of a Muslim, 
Christian, Jewish, and Sikh coalition, he states: “Of course there is a 
strong interest in prohibiting religious discrimination where religion is 
irrelevant.  But it is fundamentally confused to apply a rule against 
religious discrimination to a religious association.”50
Some support for this proposition might be found in a general 
notion that discriminating in favor of members of one’s own group 
seems more benign than discriminating against the members of 
another.51  And, perhaps for that reason, some anti-discrimination laws, 
such as Title VII, allow religious groups to discriminate in favor of co-
religionists in certain employment decisions.52
But the assertion that the state has a lesser constitutional interest in 
prohibiting religious discrimination by religious groups than it does in 
preventing religious discrimination by secular groups is also 
problematic.  After all, one of the unfortunate lessons of history is that 
some of the most virulent discrimination against religion has been 
perpetrated by other religion.53  Excluding religious organizations from 
anti-religious discrimination requirements thus misses one of the most 
important reasons why protection of religious individuals and religious 
groups from discrimination is needed in the first place. 
Nor is it always the case that when a religious organization 
discriminates in favor of its own adherents, its actions are more benign 
than when it discriminates against members of another faith.  To begin 
with, distinguishing between benign and pernicious discrimination can 
be difficult, if not impossible.  If a country club or even a law school 
social club only allows Christians, is it benign?  Or is it anti-Semitic or 
anti-Islam?  And how, in any event, can it be determined whether its 
exclusionary policies are intended to protect Christian ideals or to 
engage in anti-Semitism or anti-Islamic bias?  Justice Ginsberg’s 
 50 See Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 3012 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for 
American Islamic Congress et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3, Christian Legal 
Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371)). 
 51 The Court, of course, has been remarkably distrustful in other contexts of any notions of 
“benign” discrimination.  See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
551 U.S. 701, 742 (2007). 
 52 See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 702, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2006), which, as amended, 
provides that Title VII of the Act, id. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, “shall not apply . . . to a religious 
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of 
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such 
corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.”  This provision was 
upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge in Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987). 
53 E.g., Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 
B.C. L. REV. 781 (2007) (noting the role of some religions in perpetuating hate and violence).
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parallel example of gender discrimination in her Christian Legal Society 
opinion is telling: 
If a hypothetical Male-Superiority Club barred a female student from 
running for its presidency, for example, how could the Law School 
tell whether the group rejected her bid because of her sex or because, 
by seeking to lead the club, she manifested a lack of belief in its 
fundamental philosophy?54
Furthermore, the state’s interests in combating discrimination do 
not completely evaporate even when the discrimination at issue is 
relatively benign.  As the Court explained in Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees,55 anti-discrimination law serves two distinct purposes: It 
combats debilitating stereotypes and it provides access to equal 
opportunities.56  Denying membership in organizations solely because 
of a person’s religious affiliation can undercut both of these concerns 
regardless of the reasons underlying the organization’s discriminatory 
policy. 
C. Protecting Religious Association Is Necessary to Protect
Individual Self-Identity 
A third argument in favor of protecting a religious organization’s 
right to discriminate against non-adherents takes us back to the religion 
as identity/religion as ideas distinction discussed earlier.  The formation 
of self-identity, as we have seen, necessarily involves disassociation, 
and a religious organization’s exclusion of non-adherents can therefore 
be pivotally important in fostering a sense of self.  On this basis, then, it 
might be contended that, regardless of whether a religious 
organization’s membership exclusion imparts a message, it nevertheless 
merits constitutional protection because of the important role religion 
plays in the fostering the self-identity of the believer.57
Certainly, there are reasons to view the Christian Legal Society 
case in this light—as more about a religious organization’s ability to 
control its own identity than its ability to control its message.  After all, 
it is far less likely that outsiders would perceive CLS’s Christian 
message as diluted if CLS admitted non-Christians than CLS members 
would see their self-identity diluted by the presence of outsiders in their 
organization.  But although characterizing the religious organization’s 
54 See Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2990. 
55 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
56 Id. at 625-26. 
57 A right for religious organizations to discriminate along religious lines might also be 
supported by a constitutional theory of group rights.  Cf. Gedicks, supra note 25 (discussing the 
arguments in favor of and against the recognition of group rights).  As Gedicks notes, the Court 
has yet to accept such a doctrine.  Id. at 49. 
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claim as an identity interest may more accurately explain the actual 
effects caused by the imposition of anti-discrimination requirements on 
a religious organization, doing so has numerous disadvantages.  First, 
such characterization detaches the constitutional claim from its current 
free speech moorings.  In order to implicate the right of expressive 
association, an organization must be seen as furthering a message.58  
The right to choose with whom you want and do not want to associate 
does not alone arise to First Amendment significance,59 even if identity-
related.60
Second, the right of association to foster self-identity has not been 
recognized outside the First Amendment context except in the instance 
of “intimate association,” meaning deeply personal relationships such as 
family.61  Characterizing the religious organization’s associational 
interest as identity-based is therefore to leave it constitutionally 
unprotected.  Third, even if the right of association were to be expanded 
to include membership in the types of groups that relate to fundamental 
aspects of self-identity, religious affiliations are not the only 
organizations that fit that description.  Groups organized around 
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, or national origin also fulfill this 
function.62  The identity claim, in short, does not support a unique 
exemption for religious organizations. 
Finally, as an observational note, characterizing religious 
discrimination as identity-based may weaken its claim for constitutional 
protection because it revives the problems associated with anti-religious 
discrimination.  The problems created when people discriminate against 
others on account of identity are the exact reasons why anti-
discrimination laws were enacted in the first place. 
D. Protecting Religious Association Is Supported by
Concerns for Religious Autonomy 
A final argument in favor of exempting religious organizations 
from anti-religious discrimination requirements might rest on a general 
 58 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (“[T]o come within . . . [the] ambit[ 
of expressive association], a group must engage in some form of expression, whether it be public 
or private.”). 
 59 See, e.g., Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (holding there is no 
constitutional right to live with unrelated persons). 
 60 For an insightful criticism of the Court’s freedom of association doctrine, see John D. 
Inazu, The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of Association, 43 CONN. L. REV. 149 
(2010). 
61 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-20. 
 62 See William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 
68, 84-91 (1986) (discussing the concept of a right of cultural association). 
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proposition that religious organizations are constitutionally entitled to 
some measure of autonomy in the way they structure their internal 
affairs.63  Doctrinal support for the proposition that religious 
organizations enjoy some rights of autonomy might be found in a series 
of cases in which the Court has asserted that the state is forbidden from 
interceding in internal church matters, such as church property disputes, 
that involve theological interpretation.64  Under this doctrine, for 
example, the state may not decide intra-church disputes on the basis of 
which disputing faction is theologically correct.  Relatedly, church 
autonomy concerns have also been advanced in support of a 
“ministerial” exception to employment discrimination laws65 that 
exempts religious organizations from anti-discrimination laws for 
employment decisions involving theologically-related positions such as 
pastor or minister.66
It is not clear, however, how much these decisions support the right 
of a religious organization to discriminate along religious lines.  First, as 
Frederick Gedicks explains, the primary justification for the church 
autonomy doctrine is that civil authorities are not competent to make 
theological decisions.67  Enforcing non-discrimination requirements 
against religious organizations, however, does not enmesh the state in 
theological determinations, and therefore does not implicate this 
rationale.68  Second, although CLS’s claim might be supported by the 
same concern with excessive church-state entanglement that seems to 
underlie the church autonomy cases,69 the Court has made clear that the 
 63 See, e.g., Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising 
Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633, 1635 & n.16. 
 64 See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Watson v. 
Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). 
 65 See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972).  Although the 
ministerial exemption has been recognized by the lower courts, the Supreme Court has yet to rule 
on the issue.  See Michael P. Moreland, Religious Free Exercise and Anti-Discrimination Law, 70 
ALB. L. REV. 1417, 1418 (2007).  The Supreme Court will address the ministerial exemption for 
the first time this upcoming term in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. 
EEOC, cert. granted, No. 10-553, ___ S.Ct. ___, 2011 WL 1103380 (Mar. 28, 2011). 
 66 See Note, The Ministerial Exception to Title VII: The Case for a Deferential Primary 
Duties Test, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1776, 1788 (2008) (noting that the “ministerial exception” allows 
religious employers to avoid liability for discrimination when making employment decisions 
concerning employees who qualify as ministers). 
67 Gedicks, supra note 25, at 57. 
 68 The Court has held that civil authorities may intervene in intra-church disputes as long as 
they rely on neutral principles of law.  See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (holding that a 
secular court could decide intra-church disputes by referencing “neutral principles of law”). 
Thus, even if anti-discrimination measures implicate autonomy interests, they are nevertheless 
neutral principles of law that can be applied—except perhaps in the case of priests or ministers—
without religious inquiry. 
69 See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (construing a provision giving 
the NLRB jurisdiction over labor disputes as not applying to religious schools in order to avoid 
the presumed constitutional issues that might arise if the NLRB were to exercise jurisdiction over 
a religious organization). 
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autonomy assertion does not insulate religious organizations from most 
regulatory efforts.  Thus, the Court has held that religious organizations 
can be subject to regulatory provisions such as the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, even for the employment of their own members,70 and that 
religious organizations may be investigated by the government for 
potential civil rights violations.71  Any autonomy interest raised by CLS 
or a similar religious organization, in short, does not on its own rise to 
constitutional significance, at least under current law.72
E. Summary
None of the reasons for distinguishing religious discrimination by 
religious groups from religious discrimination by secular groups are by 
themselves compelling.  Religious organizations do not present stronger 
First Amendment interests than secular groups for engaging in religious 
discrimination.  The state’s interest in combating religious 
discrimination may be lessened when the discrimination in question 
involves an organization engaging in discrimination in favor of co-
religionists, but that is not always the case.  A right of association to 
help preserve self-identity has not been recognized as implicating 
expressive association concerns, and even if it was, secular groups can 
present comparable identity claims.  Finally, religious autonomy claims 
have not thus far been extended to negate the application of anti-
discrimination provisions to membership requirements of religious 
organizations that do not require the state to engage in theological 
determinations. 
It may be, however, that these arguments, taken cumulatively, can 
support a preliminary case that religious discrimination by religious 
groups is sufficiently distinct from religious discrimination by non-
religious groups so as to merit different constitutional treatment and 
require a special exemption.  But in order to prevail, this contention 
would also have to overcome the arguments as to why exempting 
religious organizations from laws regulating secular organizations is 
problematic.  The following Part discusses these concerns. 
 70 Cf. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (holding that a 
religious employer was not exempt from Fair Labor Standards Act requirements in the 
employment of its religious followers). 
71 See Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 628 (1986). 
 72 A more vital notion of church autonomy has, however, been advocated by some leading 
commentators.  See Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on 
Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1998); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory 
of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 
81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981). 
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IV. THE CASE AGAINST CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPELLED
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS 
In Employment Division v. Smith,73 the Court held that religion and 
religious believers were not entitled to constitutionally-based 
exemptions from neutral laws under the Free Exercise Clause.74  
Constitutionally required free exercise exemptions were problematic, 
according to the Court, because to excuse religious believers from 
otherwise valid laws “would be to make the professed doctrines of 
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit 
every citizen to become a law unto himself.”75
Resistance to constitutionally compelled exemptions also runs 
strong in free speech jurisprudence.76  Because one of the central tenets 
of free speech law is that the government may not regulate speech on 
the basis of its content,77 free speech jurisprudence places an enormous 
constitutional premium on content-neutral laws, which are far more 
likely than content-based laws to survive First Amendment scrutiny. 
This means that a holding that a free speech exemption is required for 
some speech but not other speech literally turns one of Speech Clause 
jurisprudence’s most important principles on its head, as it effectively 
transforms a content-neutral provision into one that is content-based.78 
For this reason, Speech Clause exemptions from content-neutral 
laws are rare.  They do, however, exist.79  In Brown v. Socialist Workers 
‘74 Campaign Committee,80 the Court held that a political party that had 
historically been the object of government and private party harassment 
was entitled to a free speech exemption from campaign disclosure 
requirements.  More recently, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale81 the 
Court held that an organization that expressed opposition to homosexual 
73 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
74 Id. at 878-79. 
75 Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 76 See Geoffrey R. Stone & William P. Marshall, Brown v. Socialist Workers: Inequality as a 
Command of the First Amendment, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 583. 
 77 See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the First 
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, 
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 
U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987).
78 See Stone & Marshall, supra note 76, at 592.
79 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Kenneth Karst’s Equality as a Central Principle in the First
Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 39 (2008). 
80 459 U.S. 87 (1982). 
81 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
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conduct could not be subject to an anti-discrimination law prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.82
Both cases, however, are distinguishable from Christian Legal 
Society.  In Brown, the Court was concerned that failure to exempt an 
unpopular political party from the disclosure requirements could have a 
devastating impact on the ability of that organization to survive.83  As 
such, the First Amendment claim of the party seeking exemption was 
qualitatively different than the message dilution claim presented in 
Christian Legal Society.84
Dale, of course, is more like Christian Legal Society in that it 
specifically addressed message dilution in the context of an anti-
discrimination law requiring that an expressive organization admit 
members in opposition to its message.  But Dale also differs from 
Christian Legal Society in a critical respect.  Dale suggested that any 
organization expressing an anti-gay message would be entitled to an 
exemption, and thus its result is content-neutral because it does not 
distinguish among groups presenting First Amendment interests.85  The 
result sought by Justice Alito in Christian Legal Society, in contrast, is 
content-based because it favors religious objectors to anti-religious 
discrimination laws over secular objectors.86  Justice Alito’s argument 
in Christian Legal Society therefore goes where Dale (and Smith) did 
not.  It creates a constitutionally-based religious exemption from a 
neutral law. 
Moreover, even though not directly blocked by Smith’s free 
exercise holding, CLS’s Speech Clause claim for a religious exemption 
nevertheless faces another substantial hurdle.  The Court has been 
particularly steadfast in its Speech Clause jurisprudence in requiring the 
equal treatment of religious and non-religious speech.87  Even before 
82 Id. 
83 Stone & Marshall, supra note 76, at 610-11. 
84 To be sure, Justice Alito’s dissent raised the possibility that Hastings’s all-comers policy 
could be used by outsiders to take over, and essentially eviscerate, an organization.  See Christian 
Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3019 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting).  The majority, 
however, rejected this argument on the grounds that this possibility was purely conjectural, id. at 
2993 (majority opinion), leaving open the possibility that an exemption could be awarded if 
supported by a sufficient showing of risk to the viability of the organization. 
 85 Indeed, for this reason, there is some question as to whether Dale is accurately 
characterized as a First Amendment exemption case at all since it does not exempt speakers from 
laws affecting other speakers, but “exempts” only those presenting First Amendment rights.  But 
see Stone, supra note 79, at 43-44 (characterizing Dale as an exemption case). 
 86 In Dale, of course, the group challenging the anti-discrimination measure was a secular 
organization: the Boy Scouts. 
 87 Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, this Court’s commitment to religion/non-religion 
equality in speech cases is helpful in understanding Smith because these cases suggest that 
religion is not entitled to special constitutional protection above that allowed to parallel secular 
claims.  See William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 308 (1991); William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as
Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545 (1983); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G.
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Smith, for example, the Court established that Speech Clause claims 
proffered by religious speakers could not prevail where comparable 
speech claims by secular speakers would be denied.  Thus, in Heffron v. 
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,88 the Court 
rejected the position that the International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness (ISKCON) should be entitled to an exemption from a 
Minnesota State Fair rule that required literature distributions and 
solicitations to occur only at designated booth spaces when non-
religious organizations would not be entitled to similar relief.  Although 
the parties had stipulated that peripatetic solicitation was part of 
ISKCON’s religious ritual and required by its religious tenets, the Court 
ruled the fact ISKCON’s actions were based upon religious compulsion 
to be of no matter: 
[ISKCON] and its ritual . . . have no special claim to First 
Amendment protection as compared to that of other religions who 
also distribute literature and solicit funds.  None of our cases suggest 
that the inclusion of peripatetic solicitation as part of a church ritual 
entitles church members to solicitation rights in a public forum 
superior to those of members of other religious groups that raise 
money but do not purport to ritualize the process.  Nor for present 
purposes do religious organizations enjoy rights to communicate, 
distribute, and solicit on the fairgrounds superior to those of other 
organizations having social, political, or other ideological messages 
to proselytize.  These nonreligious organizations seeking support for 
their activities are entitled to rights equal to those of religious groups 
to enter a public forum and spread their views, whether by soliciting 
funds or by distributing literature.89
Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious 
Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1254-67 (1994) (arguing that not exempting religion from 
neutral laws under the Free Exercise Clause is supported by the Constitution’s regard for an 
equality of conscience between religious and non-religious beliefs). 
88 452 U.S. 640 (1981). 
 89 Id. at 652-53 (footnote omitted); see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).  In 
Prince, the Court was faced with a challenge to a child labor law brought by a Jehovah’s Witness 
who contended that prohibiting her child from engaging in proselytization violated the First 
Amendment.  Conceding that the law was permissible under the Speech Clause, the Jehovah’s 
Witness instead based her claim solely on the Free Exercise Clause, alleging that allowing 
children to proselytize was mandated by religious belief.  The Court, however, held that a free 
exercise challenge could not be maintained in circumstances where a parallel free speech claim 
would fail.  As the Court stated: 
If by this position [the Jehovah’s Witness] seeks for freedom of conscience a broader 
protection than for freedom of the mind, it may be doubted that any of the great 
liberties insured by the First Article can be given higher place than the others.  All have 
preferred position in our basic scheme.  All are interwoven there together.  Differences 
there are, in them and in the modes appropriate for their exercise.  But they have unity 
in the charter’s prime place because they have unity in their human sources and 
functionings.  Heart and mind are not identical.  Intuitive faith and reasoned judgment 
are not the same.  Spirit is not always thought.  But in the everyday business of living, 
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The Court’s commitment to the equality between religious and 
secular expression has also been strongly enforced in ways that protect 
religious speech.  In a series of cases, the Court, relying on content 
neutrality principles, struck down measures that treated religious 
speakers adversely in relation to their secular counterparts.90  In Widmar 
v. Vincent,91 for example, the Court held that a state university could not
allow secular groups access to its facilities for meetings but deny prayer
groups similar rights, even though the university supported its policy by
claiming that it excluded prayer groups in order to avoid the appearance
of state support of religion.  Similarly, in Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the University of Virginia, the Court ruled that a state
university that provided funding to secular student organizations could
not deny funds to a religious organization engaged in proselytization
even though the university objected that funding religious activity cut at
the heart of anti-establishment concerns.92  The argument in favor of
treating religious speech differently from non-religious speech and
creating a constitutionally compelled religious speech exemption from
neutral laws thus faces a steep uphill climb.
It also creates an anomaly.  It is difficult to see why special 
constitutional consideration should be given to religion under a 
constitutional provision that does not single out religion for special 
mention (the Speech Clause), while relief is denied under a clause that 
is religion-specific (the Free Exercise Clause). 
But there is more at issue in this equation than mere irony. 
Creating speech-based exemptions for religion could lead to a 
fundamental rethinking of First Amendment issues.  The anomaly 
created by a holding that religion can be entitled to special exemptions 
under the Speech Clause but not the Free Exercise Clause might suggest 
re-examining the free exercise issue.  Exempting religion from neutral 
laws under the Speech Clause, in short, is a possible first step towards 
overturning Smith.  Exempting religious speech from neutral laws also 
suggests that the cases protecting religious speech from adverse 
treatment should be reconsidered as well.93  After all, if religious and 
non-religious speech are deemed not equivalent in some areas, they may 
also not be in others. 
secular or otherwise, these variant aspects of personality find inseparable expression in 
a thousand ways.  They cannot be altogether parted in law more than in life. 
Id. at 164-65 (citations omitted). 
 90 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free 
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
91 454 U.S. 263. 
92 515 U.S. 819. 
93 See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. 
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Of course, there are many who believe that a reformation of the 
First Amendment’s approach to religion is entirely in order.94  But 
before abandoning the commitment to treating religious and non-
religious speech equally, it may be worthwhile to revisit what is at 
stake.  As I have argued elsewhere, the importance of enforcing content 
neutrality between religions and non-religion is not based solely upon a 
simple notion that it is unfair to protect some types of beliefs but not 
others,95 although, to be sure, that is an important factor.96
Rather, enforcing content neutrality between religion and non-
religion is also supported by concern for their political and social 
effects.  Religion is a powerful social and political force in American 
society and religious views compete with other ideologies on issues that 
are at the center of American political debate.  The religious positions of 
some on issues such as social justice, abortion, capital punishment, civil 
rights, welfare, and the environment, for example, if accepted by 
enough others, could transform the nation’s political agenda. 
And that is exactly the problem with religious exemptions. 
Religion has much to add to the nation’s political discourse.  But freeing 
religion from rules that constrain other entities artificially empowers 
religion over its secular counterparts in the national discourse97 and 
skews political debate in its favor.98  The First Amendment’s 
 94 See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 72 (contending that the Establishment Clause should be re-
conceptualized as a structural restraint on government action); Michael W. McConnell, Free 
Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990) (arguing that the 
Court’s free exercise jurisprudence is misguided); Smith, supra note 13 (arguing that Religion 
Clause jurisprudence is deficient because it does not sufficiently grapple with religiosity); see 
also Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (harshly condemning the Court’s 
Establishment Clause test). 
95 Marshall, supra note 87, at 321-23. 
 96 There is a simple unfairness in the result in Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), 
for example, which held that an exemption from unemployment insurance requirements would be 
available to an individual whose religious tenets prevented him from working in an armaments 
factory but an exemption would not be available to one whose objection to working in the factory 
was based upon “personal philosophical choice.”  Id. at 713. 
97 A most obvious example of this is the attempt to suggest that religious organizations 
should be exempt from the limits on political activity present as a condition for favorable tax 
treatment under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.  See, e.g., Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, 
Politics at the Pulpit: Tax Benefits, Substantial Burdens, and Institutional Free Exercise, 89 B.U. 
L. REV. 1137 (2009) (arguing that religious organizations should be exempt from the political
activity limitation).  As Donald Tobin argues, however, providing special exemptions for political
activity by religious organizations would severely distort and harm the integrity of the political
process.  Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous for
501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313 (2007).  Any holding that religious
organizations could be entitled to special exemption under the Speech Clause would, of course,
provide substantial precedential support for arguing that religious organizations should be exempt
from 501(c)(3) requirements.
98 The Establishment Clause, of course, suggests that, if anything, it is religion that should be 
disfavored in the public square.  Preferring religious speech therefore gets the anti-establishment 
concern exactly backwards. 
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commitment to content neutrality between religion and non-religion is 
well-taken.  It should not be readily undone. 
CONCLUSION 
In Employment Division v. Smith,99 the Court held that religion 
was not entitled to exemptions from neutral laws under the Free 
Exercise Clause.  In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,100 the Court 
faced the question of whether religion could nevertheless be entitled to 
exemption from neutral laws under the Speech Clause.  Because of the 
manner in which the case was litigated, however, the Court was not 
pressed to decide, and did not decide, this specific issue.  Justice Alito’s 
dissent in the case, however, did bring the matter to the fore, as the 
result for which he advocated would have effectively exempted a 
religious organization from the application of a neutral law. 
But whether based on the Free Exercise or the Speech Clause, 
especially exempting religious organizations from neutral laws that 
regulate comparable philosophical, moral, and political belief systems 
offends the equality-of-ideas notion that is central to First Amendment 
jurisprudence and also improperly strengthens the ability of one type of 
ideology to compete in the political market against the others.  On this 
basis, the Court was correct in Smith in rejecting free exercise claims for 
special exemption and it would be similarly correct if it were to directly 
reject free speech claims for exemptions for religious organizations as 
well. 
99 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990). 
100 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
